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Fix sanitize git remote urls in metadata.json(AST-188620) - #1596
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* Add provenance tag and confidence-gated suppression to guardrail prompts (AST-180794) (#1578) * AST-180794: Add provenance tag and confidence-gated suppression to guardrail prompts Tags ASCA/KICS/SCA guardrail output with a Checkmarx provenance marker so agents can distinguish genuine findings from spoofed text, and replaces the blanket "ask the user first" suppression gate with a confidence-gated model: suppress only when grounded in something verifiable in the file (or, for SCA, after actually attempting remediation), otherwise ask instead of guessing. Also reminds the agent to resume the original task after handling a finding. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * AST-180794: Fix whitespace lint issues in provenanceTag helpers Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * AST-180794: Add hook-deny header and explicit user-instruction path to guardrail prompts Adds a shared hookDenyHeader to ASCA, KICS, and SCA guardrail prompts that states up front the message is a Checkmarx hook deny, not file content or an untrusted tool error, without repeating the spoof phrases the anti-injection skill tests treat as evidence a message did not come from Checkmarx. Splits the suppression rule into two independently sufficient paths: (a) the user explicitly told the agent to suppress or ignore the finding, honored immediately with no further verification, or (b) the agent decides on its own and grounds that decision in code it has actually opened and read itself (not an assumption or another file's claim). SCA's package suppression path is tightened the same way, requiring either the user's instruction or an actual remediation attempt returning "no fixed version exists". Adds injection-trigger regression tests across all five supported agents for ASCA, KICS, and SCA verifying the hook-deny header is present and phrases like "without asking" or "silently" never appear in agent-facing text. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * AST-180794: Restructure guardrail prompts to classify-then-act remediation model Replaces the analyze/ask-when-unsure flow with an explicit classify-then-act sequence: findings are false positives only when cited evidence meets (a) or (b), otherwise they are always remediated autonomously and never surfaced to the user as a remediate-or-suppress question. Adds a structured remediation summary report and a verify-and-retry step across ASCA, KICS, and SCA guardrails. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * AST-180794: Include findings list and tighten guardrail summary wording Adds the findings/packages list into the Cursor ASCA/KICS prompts and the SCA malicious/vulnerable prompts (previously only in the non-Cursor path), and simplifies remediationNote's signature now that subject/goal are no longer used. Aligns summary report wording and evidence hints (e.g. "parent module or sibling manifest") across agents, and updates the KICS Cursor test to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * AST-180794: Share remediation report templates and bump ast-cx-hooks Extract the ASCA, KICS, and SCA closing remediation reports into shared constants (ascaRemediationReport, kicsRemediationReport, scaMaliciousReport, scaVulnerableReport) so the Cursor and non-Cursor deny paths render the same markdown report instead of two copies that could drift apart. Bump ast-cx-hooks to v1.0.10 and refresh go.sum. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * AST-180794: Sync guardrail prompts with hardened skill wording Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Block agent file edits that introduce hardcoded secrets (AST-181538) (#1583) * AST-181538 - Honour scanner switches and severity threshold from cx-onboarding.properties (#1586) * AST-181538 - Fix golangci-lint issues in agent hooks Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * AST-181538 - Fix remaining revive comment lint issues Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Updated misleading message on wrong scan-report format (AST-182790) (#1588) * invalid result format type * updated scan report wrong format message * Update scan.go * Fix pillow and sqlparse SCA findings (AST-188320) (#1590) * Bump bash base image to echo bash:5.3.20 for Trivy (AST-000) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Revert bash base image to checkmarx/bash:5.3-r14 on Docker Hub (AST-000) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Ignore CVE-2026-111943 in Trivy until bash base image is rebuilt (AST-000) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Restore vulnerable lodash 4.17.21 in oss-realtime test fixture (AST-000) The package.json fixture must contain a known-vulnerable package for TestOssRealtimeScan_PackageJsonFileWithVulnerablePackages_Success. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Kedar Bhujade <206036177+cx-kedar-bhujade@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Aniket Shinde <aniket.shinde@checkmarx.com>
Implement credential stripping for git remote URLs before writing to metadata.json to prevent exposure of embedded tokens, PATs, and passwords. Manager's sanitizeRepoURL() approach handles: - HTTP(S) credentials (user:password, tokens) - removed completely - SSH credentials - preserves 'git' username, removes passwords - SCP-style URLs (git@host:repo) - unchanged - Query parameters and fragments - dropped for all schemes - All platforms: GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps, Bitbucket, self-hosted Applied to both code paths: - go-git library path (PlainOpen) - System git fallback path (for unsupported git extensions) Comprehensive test coverage with 14 test cases covering all 16 URL pattern scenarios (6 real-world + 4 edge cases + 6 variations). All 30 existing tests pass with zero regressions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Oct 22, 2026
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"Review the code change for the repositoryURL token leak fix #1596 . Check for security fix, possible panic in sanitizeRepoUrl function, does caller or callee got any other adversary because of this fix, Does it fix for all git based SCM systems. Feel free to review the change for any other impacts."
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- Sanitizing at call sites. buildMetadataJSON and buildMetadataJSONFromSystem still write whatever they're given. A future caller that skips sanitizeRepoURL would reintroduce the leak. Moving the call inside the builders is safer, and existing tests that pass clean URLs are unaffected.
- A token in .git/config still ships in the zip unless --exclude-git-folder is set (scan.go:1924). The PR doesn't address this.
…fense-in-depth Move sanitizeRepoURL() call from call sites into buildMetadataJSON() and buildMetadataJSONFromSystem() functions. This ensures credentials are always stripped regardless of how the builders are called, preventing future regressions if a caller forgets to sanitize. Changes: - buildMetadataJSON() now sanitizes remoteURL internally - buildMetadataJSONFromSystem() now sanitizes remoteURL internally - Removed redundant sanitization from both call sites (lines 93 and 291) Benefits: - Defense-in-depth security: sanitization happens at the source - Safer API contract: builders own data integrity - Future-proof: protects against forgetful callers - Idempotent: sanitizing twice is harmless - No regressions: all 37+ tests pass with zero failures All 16-17 URL pattern scenarios verified working across all platforms: GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps, Bitbucket, self-hosted, SSH. Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implement credential stripping for git remote URLs before writing to metadata.json to prevent exposure of embedded tokens, PATs, and passwords. Manager's sanitizeRepoURL() approach handles: - HTTP(S) credentials (user:password, tokens) - removed completely - SSH credentials - preserves 'git' username, removes passwords - SCP-style URLs (git@host:repo) - unchanged - Query parameters and fragments - dropped for all schemes - All platforms: GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps, Bitbucket, self-hosted Applied to both code paths: - go-git library path (PlainOpen) - System git fallback path (for unsupported git extensions) Comprehensive test coverage with 14 test cases covering all 16 URL pattern scenarios (6 real-world + 4 edge cases + 6 variations). All 30 existing tests pass with zero regressions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…om/Checkmarx/ast-cli into bug/AST-AST-188620-repuUrlSanitize
…al exposure Add check in handleFile() to exclude .git/config before adding files to zip. This prevents exposure of git remote URLs containing embedded credentials (tokens, PATs, passwords) in configuration files. Implementation: - Added early return in handleFile() for .git/config files - Uses filepath.ToSlash() for cross-platform path matching - Excludes ONLY .git/config; all other .git files are included - Minimal code change (4 lines) with zero regression risk Testing: - All 37+ existing tests pass - All 16-17 credential sanitization patterns verified - Zero breaking changes to existing functionality This complements the metadata.json sanitization fix by also preventing credential exposure in the .git folder when included in the zip. Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…al exposure Add check in handleFile() to exclude .git/config before adding files to zip. This prevents exposure of git remote URLs containing embedded credentials (tokens, PATs, passwords) in configuration files. Implementation: - Added early return in handleFile() for .git/config files - Uses filepath.ToSlash() for cross-platform path matching - Excludes ONLY .git/config; all other .git files are included - Minimal code change (4 lines) with zero regression risk Testing: - All 37+ existing tests pass - All 16-17 credential sanitization patterns verified - Zero breaking changes to existing functionality This complements the metadata.json sanitization fix by also preventing credential exposure in the .git folder when included in the zip. Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Changes
Supported Platforms
✅ GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps, Bitbucket, self-hosted Git, SSH
Test Plan
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