docs(auth): document certificate-bound tokens for agent identities by macastelaz · Pull Request #14557 · googleapis/google-cloud-java

macastelaz · 2026-09-30T17:08:57Z

Important

Merge after #14559, which adds IdTokenProvider.Option.DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN referenced here. Both must merge before the agentic-identities-bound-token feature branch is merged to main.

What this adds

Docs only; no code changes.

ComputeEngineCredentials class Javadoc: adds a brief summary noting that when a workload certificate for an agent identity is available, ComputeEngineCredentials requests certificate-bound access tokens and ID tokens by default, with pointers to IdTokenProvider.Option.DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN and the Google Auth Library guide.
The full "Certificate-bound tokens for agent identities" user guide section (covering environment variables, per-target ID token opt-out, and the ADK for Java limitation) is being added to the DevSite getting-started-with-google-auth-library page (cl/996749889) alongside the Cloud Run documentation (cl/990396526).

Release notes

google-auth-library-java/CHANGELOG.md is generated, so release notes come from commit messages. Suggested text for the BEGIN_COMMIT_OVERRIDE block of the feature-branch → main merge PR:

feat(auth): request certificate-bound tokens for agent identities by default. Set GOOGLE_API_ENABLE_RUNTIME_BOUND_TOKEN=false to opt out.
feat(auth): add IdTokenProvider.Option.DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN to request unbound ID tokens for specific targets.
docs(auth): known limitation: ADK for Java doesn't support mTLS yet; agents that use it must set GOOGLE_API_ENABLE_RUNTIME_BOUND_TOKEN=false.

Testing

google-java-format and javadoc:javadoc pass.

gemini-code-assist

Code Review

This pull request introduces support for certificate-bound access and ID tokens for agent identities within ComputeEngineCredentials. It adds a new AgentIdentityUtils utility class to manage certificate discovery, SPIFFE trust domain validation, cryptographic key-pair verification, and credential caching. ComputeEngineCredentials is updated to request bound tokens via POST requests to the metadata server when a workload certificate is available. Feedback on the changes suggests improving code readability in the test suite by avoiding fully qualified class names when the class is already imported.

gemini-code-assist · 2026-09-30T17:10:52Z

+    Files.write(keyPath, mismatchedKeyPem.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
+    Files.setLastModifiedTime(


Avoid using fully qualified class names (such as java.nio.file.attribute.FileTime) if there is no class name conflict in the file and the class is already imported, as it unnecessarily reduces code readability.

Files.setLastModifiedTime( keyPath, FileTime.fromMillis(System.currentTimeMillis() + 10000));

References

Do not use fully qualified class names if there is no class name conflict in the file and the class is already imported, as it unnecessarily reduces code readability.

…igquery pom (#14587) ## Why Every PR into `agentic-identities-bound-token` is currently failing CI (for example #14559 and #14557, about 35 jobs each) with: ``` [ERROR] 'dependencies.dependency.(groupId:artifactId:type:classifier)' must be unique: com.google.cloud:google-cloud-storage:jar -> duplicate declaration of version (?) [ERROR] 'dependencies.dependency.(groupId:artifactId:type:classifier)' must be unique: com.google.cloud:google-cloud-datacatalog:jar -> duplicate declaration of version 1.102.0-SNAPSHOT [ERROR] The build could not read 1 project ``` `java-bigquery/google-cloud-bigquery/pom.xml` declares `google-cloud-storage` and `google-cloud-datacatalog` twice in `<dependencies>`. This has been the case for a while, but Maven 3.9 only logged a `[WARNING]`. The GitHub `ubuntu-24.04` runner image `20261004` upgraded Maven from 3.9.16 to 3.10.0, which treats it as an error, so any job that loads the reactor now fails immediately. ## Change Remove the second declaration of each dependency (11 lines, one file): - `google-cloud-storage`: drops the later test-scoped entry. This is the same change as #14586 on `main`. - `google-cloud-datacatalog`: drops the second, identical test-scoped entry. `main` no longer has this dependency in this pom, so #14586 doesn't need it. ## Verification - `mvn help:effective-pom` on the module before and after: the effective `<dependencies>` section is identical. `google-cloud-storage` stays test-scoped because the parent's `dependencyManagement` sets `<scope>test</scope>`, and the two datacatalog entries were identical. - Each artifact now appears once in `<dependencies>`; the pom parses as valid XML.

Adds a README section and ComputeEngineCredentials class Javadoc covering: - bound tokens are the default when an agent identity workload certificate is present, and require mTLS with the same certificate - when a bound token is requested (cert discovery, agent SPIFFE trust domain) - opt-out env vars and precedence: GOOGLE_API_ENABLE_RUNTIME_BOUND_TOKEN over the legacy GOOGLE_API_PREVENT_AGENT_TOKEN_SHARING_FOR_GCP_SERVICES, and GOOGLE_API_USE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE=false also disabling binding - the process-wide scope of the opt-out - requesting unbound ID tokens for specific targets with IdTokenProvider.Option.BIND_ID_TOKEN_FALSE - the ADK for Java known limitation and its workaround

lqiu96 · 2026-10-09T19:53:08Z

 See the [API Documentation](https://cloud.google.com/java/docs/reference/google-auth-library/latest/overview.html) to see
 the Javadocs for Google Auth Library.

+## Certificate-bound tokens for agent identities


FYI, I think we have moved the Auth README info to: https://docs.cloud.google.com/java/getting-started/getting-started-with-google-auth-library

Thanks for the pointer! Removed the section from README.md in 2876c2d and moved it to the DevSite getting-started-with-google-auth-library guide (cl/996749889).

lqiu96 · 2026-10-09T19:55:30Z

+ * <p><b>Certificate-bound tokens for agent identities.</b> When a workload certificate for an agent
+ * identity is available (for example, on Cloud Run with an agent identity), {@link
+ * #refreshAccessToken()} and {@link #idTokenWithAudience(String, List)} request tokens that are
+ * bound to that certificate. The certificate is located through the file named by the {@code
+ * GOOGLE_API_CERTIFICATE_CONFIG} environment variable or, if that is unset, in the default workload
+ * credentials directory. A bound token is only requested when the certificate's SPIFFE ID belongs
+ * to an agent identity trust domain; otherwise these credentials return unbound tokens as before.


Might be better to put this in the README/ docs.google.com page (feature of ComputeEngineCredentials).

(My opinion) perhaps can opt to keep javadocs of a Credential class general to what a credential type is about and a feature can have a dedicated section elsewhere. WDYT?

Sounds good! Trimmed the ComputeEngineCredentials class Javadoc down to a brief summary with a pointer to IdTokenProvider.Option.DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN and the official guide in 2876c2d, and moved the detailed section to the DevSite guide (cl/996749889).

…ME section

…te-bound ID tokens (#14559) > [!IMPORTANT] > **This must merge before the `agentic-identities-bound-token` feature branch is merged to `main`.** Docs PR #14557 documents this option. ## Why When an agent identity certificate is available, `ComputeEngineCredentials` requests certificate-bound ID tokens by default. A bound ID token is only accepted by targets that authenticate the caller over mTLS with the same certificate. Targets reached over standard HTTPS, such as a Cloud Run service's `*.run.app` URL or a custom domain, reject it with `401 Unauthorized`. Per the [ID token binding 1-pager](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yL_xdDimlUlUyid6HDtqZUIMQjX9VznwzXn1SBABjZc/edit?pli=1&resourcekey=0-GxSXGdfH5Ni_nSI9f7xkQg&tab=t.0#heading=h.94fnt3dk2gx) (Sep 30 decision), ID tokens stay bound by default, and callers get a per-target `bind_id_token` setting to turn binding off where needed. The process-wide opt-out (`GOOGLE_API_ENABLE_RUNTIME_BOUND_TOKEN=false`) is unchanged. ## What changes - New `IdTokenProvider.Option.DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN`. Callers pass it per target, the same way as `FORMAT_FULL` and `LICENSES_TRUE`: ```java IdTokenCredentials.newBuilder() .setIdTokenProvider((IdTokenProvider) credentials) .setTargetAudience("https://my-service-12345.us-central1.run.app") .setOptions(Arrays.asList(IdTokenProvider.Option.DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN)) .build(); ``` - `ComputeEngineCredentials.idTokenWithAudience()`: with the option, the certificate lookup is skipped and the identity endpoint is called with a plain GET. Without it, behavior is unchanged (bound whenever a certificate is available and binding isn't turned off by the env var). - Other credential types (`ServiceAccountCredentials`, `ImpersonatedCredentials`, `UserCredentials`) already ignore options they don't use, so the same code works outside agent identity environments. - Access tokens are unaffected. ### API shape `Option` is a set of on/off flags rather than a value, so this adds only the "off" flag (`DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN`). Leaving it unset means "auto", which currently means bound. This matches the 1-pager's tri-state (unset = auto) without adding an "enable" flag that would do nothing today; one can be added later without breaking callers if "auto" starts deciding per target. Python exposes the same control as `bind_id_token: Optional[bool]` (googleapis/google-cloud-python#18559). ## Tests ### Unit tests New `ComputeEngineCredentialsTest` cases, all with an agent identity certificate present and binding enabled: - `idTokenWithAudience_disableBoundIdToken_requestsUnboundToken`: GET, no request body, no forced `format=full`. - `idTokenWithAudience_disableBoundIdTokenWithFormatFull_requestsUnboundFullToken`: still GET; `format=full` is kept when the caller asks for it. - `idTokenWithAudience_disableBoundIdToken_skipsCertificateLookup`: with a certificate config pointing to a missing file, the default request fails, but the opted-out request succeeds, which shows the certificate is never read. - `idTokenCredentials_withDisableBoundIdTokenOption_requestsUnboundToken`: the option set on `IdTokenCredentials` reaches `ComputeEngineCredentials`. The existing bound-ID-token tests are unchanged and still pass. Full `oauth2_http` suite: 1064 tests, 0 failures. `fmt` is clean. ### Live test on GKE Run on a GKE cluster with agent identity enabled, using a test-only local merge of this PR with #14595 (GKE support) and #14556 (already on the base branch). A single process fetches ID tokens through `IdTokenCredentials` from `ComputeEngineCredentials` (ADC) and sends them to an agent-to-agent receiver pod. The receiver accepts only bound tokens over mTLS (whose `cnf` must match the client certificate), and only unbound tokens over plain HTTP. | Check | Defaults | `GOOGLE_API_ENABLE_RUNTIME_BOUND_TOKEN=false` | |---|---|---| | ID token with `DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN` | **unbound** (no `cnf`); receiver: plain HTTP 200, mTLS 401 | unbound | | ID token for another target without the option, same credentials, fetched afterwards | **still bound** (`cnf` = certificate leaf); receiver: mTLS 200 | unbound | | Access token after the ID-token opt-out | **still bound** (401 on a plain, non-mTLS endpoint) | unbound | The option unbinds only the ID token it's set on. Other targets and access tokens are unaffected, and it's harmless when binding is already off. **Internal links (Googlers only):** [results](https://paste.googleplex.com/5926225961418752) · [harness](https://paste.googleplex.com/5713819712749568) · cluster [setup](https://paste.googleplex.com/5635555912712192) and [manifests](https://paste.googleplex.com/6258309762514944) (shared with #14595)

…into HEAD

…r agent identities (#14668) ## Summary Merges the `agentic-identities-bound-token` feature branch into `main`, adding end-to-end support for certificate-bound tokens and automatic mTLS with transparent certificate rotation for agent identities on Cloud Run and GKE. ### `google-auth-library-java` (`oauth2_http`) - **Default certificate-bound tokens (`#13873`, `#14595`, `#14658`):** When an agent identity SPIFFE workload certificate is present (either via `GOOGLE_API_CERTIFICATE_CONFIG` on Cloud Run or the GKE credential bundle at `/var/run/secrets/workload-spiffe-credentials/x509.credential-bundle.private-key.pem`), `ComputeEngineCredentials` requests certificate-bound access tokens and ID tokens via `POST` to the Metadata Server with the leaf certificate chain. - **Opt-out controls (`#13873`, `#14559`, `#14557`):** - Process-wide: `GOOGLE_API_ENABLE_RUNTIME_BOUND_TOKEN=false` (or legacy `GOOGLE_API_PREVENT_AGENT_TOKEN_SHARING_FOR_GCP_SERVICES=false`) disables token binding. - Per-target ID tokens: `IdTokenProvider.Option.DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN` requests an unbound ID token for specific targets (such as plain HTTPS `*.run.app` URLs) while keeping other ID tokens and access tokens bound. - **Automatic mTLS & strict configuration (`#13995`, `#14595`, `#14658`):** - `MtlsUtils.useMtlsClientCertificate()` enables mTLS automatically when a workload certificate config or GKE credential bundle is present, unless `GOOGLE_API_USE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE` is set to a non-`"true"` value. - Missing, unreadable, or malformed explicit `GOOGLE_API_CERTIFICATE_CONFIG` files fail closed with `IllegalStateException`. - **Full mTLS certificate chain (`#14621`):** `X509Provider` and `SecureConnectProvider` now populate the mTLS key store with the full certificate chain (leaf + intermediates) via `MtlsKeyStoreUtils.createMtlsKeyStore` rather than only the leaf certificate. ### `sdk-platform-java/gax-java` (`gax`, `gax-grpc`, `gax-httpjson`) - **Transparent retries on mTLS certificate rotation (`#13995`):** - `CertificateRotationTracker` checks the SHA-256 fingerprint of the workload certificate on disk after an `UNAUTHENTICATED` failure. - `ChannelPool` (gRPC) and `RefreshingHttpJsonChannel` (HTTP/JSON) rebuild transport channels with the rotated certificate without interrupting in-flight RPCs. - `AttemptCallable` (unary) and `ServerStreamingAttemptCallable` (server streaming) issue one immediate free retry on the refreshed channel when a certificate rotation is detected. - **Fail-closed default mTLS provider loading (`#14658`):** When `useMtlsClientCertificate()` is `true`, `EndpointContext`, `InstantiatingGrpcChannelProvider`, and `InstantiatingHttpJsonChannelProvider` propagate `IOException`s (while still falling back cleanly on `CertificateSourceUnavailableException` when no certificate source exists on disk). - **Conscrypt TLS 1.3 mTLS fix (`#14556`):** `InstantiatingHttpJsonChannelProvider` uses Conscrypt's own `TrustManagerFactory` and `KeyManagerFactory` for the mTLS `SSLContext`, fixing `Unknown authType: GENERIC` on TLS 1.3 and key-manager algorithm constraint mismatches on JDK 26+. ## Sub-PRs Included on `agentic-identities-bound-token` | PR | Description | | :--- | :--- | | `#13873` | `feat: Enable Bound Token for Agentic Identities` | | `#13995` | `feat(gax): support transparent retries during mTLS certificate rotations` | | `#14556` | `fix(gax-httpjson): use Conscrypt TrustManagerFactory for mTLS SSLContext` | | `#14559` | `feat(auth): add DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN option to opt out of certificate-bound ID tokens` | | `#14557` | `docs(auth): document certificate-bound tokens for agent identities` | | `#14595` | `feat(auth): support GKE agent identity credential bundle for bound tokens and mTLS` | | `#14626` | `fix(gax): drop jsr305 annotations left over after syncing with main` | | `#14621` | `fix(auth): present the full certificate chain for mTLS` | | `#14658` | `fix(auth,gax): align Java mTLS and agent identity certificate handling with Python parity` | ## Testing - **Automated tests:** Full unit test suites in `google-auth-library-java` (`credentials`, `oauth2_http`) and `sdk-platform-java/gax-java` (`gax`, `gax-grpc`, `gax-httpjson`) pass across JDK 8, 11, 17, 21, 25, and 26, including new unit tests for certificate discovery, bound token requests, startup polling, rotation retries, Conscrypt TLS 1.3 mTLS handshakes, and full certificate chains. - **Integrated manual testing (`45/45` scenarios passed):** Built all 9 changed artifacts (`google-auth-library-credentials`, `google-auth-library-oauth2-http`, `api-common`, `gax`, `gax-grpc`, `gax-httpjson`, `google-cloud-core`, `google-cloud-core-http`, `google-cloud-core-grpc`) together from the combined branch and ran 22 live GAPIC mTLS rotation scenarios, 14 local bound-token and GAX parity checks, 3 live Cloud Run Agent Identity job executions, and 6 live GKE Agent Identity pod scenarios. <details> <summary>Full manual test matrix (45 scenarios)</summary> ### 1. Live GAPIC mTLS Rotation (`22/22` Scenarios, `125/125` Checks) Executed real `KeyManagementServiceClient` (gRPC and HTTP/JSON) and `BigQueryReadClient` (server-streaming `ReadRows`) against live `.mtls.googleapis.com` endpoints (`cloudkms.mtls.googleapis.com`, `bigquerystorage.mtls.googleapis.com`) while rotating client certificates on disk. | Group | Scenarios | What Was Verified | Result | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **Unary gRPC (`G1`–`G7`)** | `atomic-mv`, `inplace`, `symlink-swap`, `corrupt-recover`, `missing-recover`, `idle-gap`, `burst-25-rpcs` | `KeyManagementServiceClient` gRPC channel seamlessly picks up rotated certs across atomic rename, in-place write, Kubernetes-style symlink swap, corrupt/missing file recovery, idle gaps, and concurrent bursts. | **7/7 Passed** | | **Server-Streaming gRPC (`S1`–`S4`)** | `mid-stream`, `between-streams`, `reconnect-after-rotate`, `corrupt-mid-stream` | `BigQueryReadClient.readRowsCallable()` active streams continue uninterrupted during rotation; subsequent streams and reconnects use the new certificate. | **4/4 Passed** | | **Unary HTTP/JSON (`H1`–`H5`)** | `atomic-mv`, `inplace`, `corrupt-recover`, `missing-recover`, `burst-20-rpcs` | `KeyManagementServiceClient` HTTP/JSON transport reloads rotated certs and recovers from transient corrupt/missing files without dropping requests. | **5/5 Passed** | | **Startup & Providers (`N1a`, `N1b`, `C1`)** | `N1a`, `N1b`, `C1-conscrypt`, `C1-jdk` | Missing cert config handling at startup; full rotation works under both Conscrypt and JDK (`SunJSSE`) TLS providers. | **4/4 Passed** | | **Combined Assertions** | `G1`–`S4` assertions | Verified `125/125` individual assertions across 22 isolated JVMs. | **22/22 Passed** | ### 2. Local Bound-Token & GAX Parity (`14/14` Checks) | Check | PR / Area | What Was Verified | Result | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **Scenarios 1–7** | `#13873` / `#14595` | Default bound token (`cnf.x5t#S256` matches leaf), `GOOGLE_API_ENABLE_RUNTIME_BOUND_TOKEN=false`, `GOOGLE_API_USE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE=false`, cert rotation updates `x5t#S256`, and `GOOGLE_API_PREVENT_AGENT_TOKEN_SHARING_FOR_GCP_SERVICES` behavior. | **Passed** | | **Scenario 8d** | `#14658` | `GOOGLE_API_USE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE=true` with no certs falls back immediately (`43ms` GET) with no 30s polling delay. | **Passed** | | **Scenario 8e** | `#14658` | Invalid explicit `GOOGLE_API_CERTIFICATE_CONFIG` fails closed with `IOException` instead of silently downgrading. | **Passed** | | **Scenario 10** | `#14658` | 0-byte startup cert file is polled until populated rather than failing immediately. | **Passed** | | **Scenario 11** | `#14658` | Kubernetes `..data` symlinked parent directory resolves to the real directory for file watching. | **Passed** | | **Scenario 12a** | `#14559` | `IdTokenProvider.Option.DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN` returns an unbound ID token without leaking state to subsequent default calls. | **Passed** | | **Scenario 12b** | `#14621` | `X509Provider` preserves the full 2-certificate chain (`leaf + intermediate`) in the `KeyStore`. | **Passed** | | **GAX `fail-closed`** | `#14658` | Missing explicit `GOOGLE_API_CERTIFICATE_CONFIG` throws `IllegalStateException` in both `InstantiatingGrpcChannelProvider` and `InstantiatingHttpJsonChannelProvider`. | **Passed** | | **GAX `zero-ms-fallback`** | `#14658` | `GOOGLE_API_USE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE=true` with no certs builds plain gRPC and HTTP/JSON channels immediately (`0ms` polling delay). | **Passed** | ### 3. Live Cloud Run Agent Identity (`3/3` Scenarios) Tested on a Cloud Run Agent Identity job (`--functional-type=agent --identity-type=agent-identity`). | Scenario | Env Vars | Key Results | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **Default (Bound)** | *(unset)* | `DefaultMtlsProviderFactory` chain length = `2` (`#14621`). Access token acquired in `414ms`. ID token `cnf.x5t#S256` matched leaf cert. `DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN` (`#14559`) returned `cnf: false` and next default call restored `cnf: true`. GAX `ProjectsClient` (gRPC & HTTP/JSON) resolved `cloudresourcemanager.mtls.googleapis.com:443` and passed mTLS + bound-token auth (`PERMISSION_DENIED` IAM check). Non-mTLS transport rejected bound token (`401`), true mTLS passed auth (`403`), and mismatched client cert was rejected (`401`). | | **Runtime Bound Opt-Out** | `GOOGLE_API_ENABLE_RUNTIME_BOUND_TOKEN=false` | Unbound access token and ID token (`cnf` absent). Non-mTLS endpoints passed auth (`403` IAM) and live Java ADK `LlmAgent` + `Gemini` call on Vertex AI succeeded (`200 OK`). | | **Client Cert Opt-Out** | `GOOGLE_API_USE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE=false` | Unbound access token (`450ms`) and ID token (`cnf` absent). GAX `ProjectsClient` (gRPC & HTTP/JSON) resolved plain `cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com:443` and passed auth (`PERMISSION_DENIED`). Live Java ADK `LlmAgent` + `Gemini` call on Vertex AI succeeded (`200 OK`). | ### 4. Live GKE Agent Identity (`6/6` Scenarios) Tested on a GKE Agent Identity cluster against live GCP APIs (`cloudresourcemanager`, `storage`) and an in-cluster SPIFFE mTLS receiver configured to trust **only** the SPIFFE root CA (requiring the full leaf + intermediate chain from `#14621`). | Scenario | Pod Annotations | Env Vars | Key Results | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | **`s1-default`** | `inject-podcertificates=true` | *(unset)* | `bundle exists=true`, first token fetch `1430ms`, SDK KeyStore chain length = `2`, mTLS receiver (SDK KeyStore) = `200 OK`, mTLS GCS passed auth (`404`), plain GCS rejected bound token (`401`), gRPC & HTTP/JSON resolved `.mtls.googleapis.com:443` and passed auth, `DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN` -> plain `200` / mTLS `401` / default after opt-out -> mTLS `200` / access token still bound -> plain GCS `401`. | | **`s2-runtime-bound-false`** | `inject-podcertificates=true` | `GOOGLE_API_ENABLE_RUNTIME_BOUND_TOKEN=false` | Unbound tokens (`cnf=null`), mTLS receiver rejected unbound token (`401`), plain receiver accepted (`200`), raw GCS and Storage SDK (HTTP & gRPC) passed auth (`404`), gRPC & HTTP/JSON resolved `.mtls.googleapis.com:443` and passed auth. | | **`s3-use-cert-false`** | `inject-podcertificates=true` | `GOOGLE_API_USE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE=false` | Unbound tokens (`cnf=null`), gRPC & HTTP/JSON resolved plain `cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com:443` and passed auth, plain receiver = `200`, plain GCS passed auth (`404`). | | **`s4-use-cert-true`** | `inject-podcertificates=true` | `GOOGLE_API_USE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE=true` | Identical bound behavior to `s1-default`: SDK KeyStore mTLS receiver = `200`, `.mtls.googleapis.com:443` resolved and passed auth, all `DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN` checks passed. | | **`s5-no-annotation`** | *(none)* | *(unset)* | `bundle exists=false`, first token fetch `646ms` (no 30s hang), resolved plain `cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com:443`, passed auth (`PERMISSION_DENIED` / `403`). | | **`s6-use-cert-true-no-annotation`** | *(none)* | `GOOGLE_API_USE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE=true` | Verified `#14658` on real GKE: `bundle exists=false`, first token fetch `609ms` (no 30s polling delay), resolved plain `cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com:443`, passed auth (`PERMISSION_DENIED` / `403`). | </details> BEGIN_COMMIT_OVERRIDE feat(auth): request certificate-bound tokens for agent identities by default. Set GOOGLE_API_ENABLE_RUNTIME_BOUND_TOKEN=false to opt out. feat(auth): add IdTokenProvider.Option.DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN to request unbound ID tokens for specific targets. feat(auth): support GKE agent identity credential bundle for bound tokens and mTLS. fix(auth): present the full certificate chain for mTLS. docs(auth): known limitation: ADK for Java doesn't support mTLS yet; agents that use it must set GOOGLE_API_ENABLE_RUNTIME_BOUND_TOKEN=false. feat(gax): enable mTLS automatically when a workload certificate is present and support transparent retries during mTLS certificate rotations. fix(gax-httpjson): use Conscrypt TrustManagerFactory and KeyManagerFactory for mTLS SSLContext. END_COMMIT_OVERRIDE --------- Co-authored-by: Kirill Logachev <kirl@google.com> Co-authored-by: Min Zhu <zhumin@google.com> Co-authored-by: Lawrence Qiu <lawrenceqiu@google.com> Co-authored-by: yangyzs <171981480+yangyzs@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: cloud-java-bot <122572305+cloud-java-bot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Keshav Dandeva <keshavdandeva@google.com> Co-authored-by: Mattie Fu <mattiefu@google.com> Co-authored-by: Will Howes <whowes@google.com> Co-authored-by: Jin Seop Kim <jinseop@google.com> Co-authored-by: Jiang Zhu <jiangzzhu@google.com> Co-authored-by: Knut Olav Løite <koloite@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: release-please[bot] <55107282+release-please[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: rahul2393 <irahul@google.com> Co-authored-by: Sakthivel Subramanian <179120858+sakthivelmanii@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Gaole Meng <gaole@google.com> Co-authored-by: Pranav Iyer <pjiyer@google.com>

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macastelaz mentioned this pull request Sep 30, 2026

feat(auth): add DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN option to opt out of certificate-bound ID tokens #14559

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macastelaz force-pushed the docs-agent-bound-tokens branch from 145cc34 to 70f3109 Compare October 6, 2026 15:04

macastelaz changed the title ~~docs(auth): document certificate-bound tokens for agent identities [blocked on #13873]~~ docs(auth): document certificate-bound tokens for agent identities Oct 6, 2026

macastelaz mentioned this pull request Oct 6, 2026

fix(bigquery): remove duplicate test dependencies from google-cloud-bigquery pom #14587

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macastelaz force-pushed the docs-agent-bound-tokens branch from 70f3109 to d02e19a Compare October 6, 2026 17:08

macastelaz marked this pull request as ready for review October 6, 2026 17:27

macastelaz requested review from a team as code owners October 6, 2026 17:27

macastelaz requested review from lqiu96 and nbayati October 6, 2026 17:27

docs(auth): update option name to DISABLE_BOUND_ID_TOKEN

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docs(auth): condense ComputeEngineCredentials Javadoc and remove READ…

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…ME section

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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/agentic-identities-bound-token' …

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macastelaz mentioned this pull request Oct 10, 2026

docs(auth): link ComputeEngineCredentials Javadoc to bound token section #14627

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macastelaz merged commit 103734a into googleapis:agentic-identities-bound-token Oct 10, 2026
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docs(auth): document certificate-bound tokens for agent identities - #14557

docs(auth): document certificate-bound tokens for agent identities#14557
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gemini-code-assist Bot Sep 30, 2026

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lqiu96 Oct 9, 2026

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		Files.write(keyPath, mismatchedKeyPem.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
		Files.setLastModifiedTime(

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macastelaz commented Sep 30, 2026 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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macastelaz commented Sep 30, 2026 •

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